• how Governments, either as flag States, coastal States, port States or States whose nationals are employed as seafarers, should acknowledge the actual situation and current developments with regard to employment of PCASP on board ships navigating in the high-risk area and whether they should allow PCASP under their national laws;
• whether Governments, particularly coastal and port States, should allow passage of foreign ships with PCASP through their territorial waters; and whether any practical international guidance should be developed for the handling and treatment of firearms and PCASP on board ships navigating in territorial waters, including in ports of those States which have not yet established national policies in dealing with arms on board ships; and
• whether Governments should establish international guidelines on the use of firearms against suspected pirates.

The MSC will also review interim guidance for port and coastal States; flag States; and ship-owners, ship operators and shipmasters on the use of PCASP on board ships to counter Somali-based piracy. This was approved by the Inter-sessional Maritime Security and Piracy Working Group of the MSC, which met in September 2011. 

Proposed Interim Guidance to private maritime security companies (PMSC) providing privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) aboard vessels transiting the high-risk area off the east coast of Africa will also be considered.

The ship is called SMYRNI IMO 9493779

Vessels in the vicinity of this area are to exercise extreme caution.

Miguel Trovoada was speaking at the opening of the Gulf of Guinea Council of Ministers session taking place in the Angolan capital until Friday.

He said on the occasion there are some loopholes in member countries’ legislation regarding piracy, with significant differences among them at times.

The official stated that the strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea countries, both for its geographic position, amount and diversity of resources and maritime space, adds to it a growing interest, not only for the respective populations, but also for the consumer markets at world level.

According to him, the current or potential threats on these countries constitute real challenges to deal with.

However, he said the nature and amplitude of these threats, as well as the magnitude of the means required to effectively fight them requires all member countries to come together.

He said that apart from the effort of each country, there have been initiatives at bilateral and regional level that show a growing awareness about the gravity of the situation and of the need for a synergetic action.

The GGC executive secretary said that in a wider aspect, the United Nations Security Council expects a closer cooperation among the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central Africa States (ECCAS), GGC and the

Maritime Organisation of Central Africa, aiming at a regional strategy of combat of piracy.

To the executive secretary, apart from the war material and other mechanisms to be used to prevent, detect and suppress acts of piracy, there is need for a particular attention to the legislative aspect of the matter.

He also spoke of the need for the promotion of a close concert in the exploration of the natural resources of the region.

The official also mentioned the need for a dialogue framework and mechanisms of concert for the prevention and solution to conflicts associated with the elimination of economic and commercial exploitation of the natural riches existing within the territorial limits of the member states.

“We found that Libyan weapons are being sold in what is the world’s biggest black market for illegal gun smugglers, and Somali pirates are among those buying from sellers in Sierra Leone, Liberia and other countries,” said Judith van der Merwe, of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism.

“We believe our information is credible and know that some of the pirates have acquired ship mines, as well as Stinger and other shoulder-held missile launchers,” she added during an Indian Ocean naval conference yesterday.

After Libya’s ruler Muammar al-Gaddafi was killed by rebels, weaponry from his well-stocked arsenals made its way on to the black market, Ms van der Merwe said.

She added that the information had been gathered from interviews with gun smugglers, pirates and other sources.

Pirates operating from the Somali coast have raked in millions of pounds in ransoms from hijacking ships. A report in 2011 estimated that maritime piracy cost the global economy between $7 billion (£4.4bn) and $12bn through higher shipping costs and ransom payments.

Whilst Ship-owners have accepted the armed deterrent on board their vessels, there is closer interest creeping into the management of the many PMSC’s purporting to provide the ‘best service’ on the market. The ‘regulation’ word is gaining traction in the security sector and in an environment free from any one accepted and enforced standard, confusion is also beginning to enter the debate as security companies witness various standards and compliance measures surface from a variety of political and commercial standpoints.

This far, nearly all PMSC’s are signatories to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Companies (ICOC). The ICOC was originally designed for private security companies operating on land, and in the absence of anything else to benchmark the fast growing maritime security sector, have been adopted by the maritime security sector, keen to add credibility to their service in the eyes of the shipping sector and thereby increase their commercial capability.

The ICOC is now widely accepted in the sector as ‘first base’ in terms of complying with an international standard. So far it has remained somewhat innocuous, untouched and untried. But most recently it was reported that it is taking its code much more seriously and beginning to shape itself to benchmark standards of service specifically for the maritime sector, but now with sanction. This is timely, as the UK Government has also recently announced the appointment of a special interest group within the Aerospace, Defence Security and Space sectors (ADS): the Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG). As the UK’s industry partner for the regulation and accreditation of private security providers, ADS is to introduce a set of standards for the delivery of private security in both the maritime and land domains. Worthy of note is that the SCEG is focused purely upon UK security companies – wet and dry – registered in the UK (which in the maritime domain, most are) and those MARSEC firms sub-contracting UK nationals – predominantly ex UK Military. Commensurate to these standards is also the ISO 9001, widely understood across industry and complied with by PMSC’s; a worthy addition to the list of standards. It is anticipated that both the ICOC and the SCEG will charge likely contenders for future accreditation and subsequent regulation. The ICOC estimates its costs at $5m per year; costs for the SCEG are yet to be announced.

Another prominent benchmark of standards for PMSC’s is the ‘Security Association for the Maritime Industry’ (SAMI). An international and independent organisation, it has been operating on behalf of its members for nearly a year now and has corralled 150 security companies under one trade association in an effort to provide a conduit between the shipping sector and quality maritime security providers. In an effort to set a minimum standard of service and delivery, the association has worked hard to offer some transparency for a sector that has been damaged by lower cost services from less reputable operators, offering a shady form of delivery in an effort to win business. SAMI’s standard is based upon the IMO guidelines for the selection and use of PMSC’s (1405/6) and has already gained resonance in an industry keen to identify reputable providers. It has also been busy, introducing a working accreditation programme already endorsed by one of the Flag Registries: The Marshall islands, and soon to be presented to the shipping community via the IMO at MSC80 next month. SAMI’s accreditation is purely voluntary for its members, the cost of which is borne by each security company, but increasingly being recognized and accepted by the shipping sector to be sufficient for the safe and reliable delivery of armed security.

It is little surprise that the maritime security sector is unsure of which ‘standard’ to comply to, there are many vying for the same space of trust and credibility. And yet the standard has already been set with the IMO’s guidelines for the selection and use of PMSC’s in IMO circular 1405/06 and 1408. Viewed through the eyes of the customer, the shipping sector, the IMO guidelines are the minimum standards to be achieved, this far nothing more, and certainly nothing less. Of course it is in the interests of everyone to require and enforce high standards. BIMCO, the industry’s largest shipping association has just launched the ‘GUARDCON’, designed to standardize the contract between PMSC and Ship-owner. It also seeks to clarify roles, responsibilities and most importantly of all the separation of liability between security team and master. For a security company placing guys, guns and skillsets on board commercial vessels, the whole process is an extremely complex and challenging undertaking. For the ship owner, it is equally highly risky, not least where most feel nervous at the mere sight of a weapon, but more importantly the issues of liability and culpability in the event of dire consequences. Yet despite these inherent risks, the armed deterrent is acknowledged as a necessary (and proven) measure to safeguard master, crew, vessel and cargo through high-risk areas. It is natural to assume that for the customer it should be gratifying to know that a security provider is delivering something to best of their ability. Currently, a ship owner wishing to scrutinise a security provider, an independent background check is completed through a ‘due diligence’ process. Exactly what is contained in this process is often a closely guarded secret; a security company waits for an impromptu inspection by clipboard to note how it delivers its product. The “wheels” of the security company are kicked thoroughly by the client, a necessary task in the absence of one ‘standard’.

Obviously from the security companies perspective, it would like to make the ‘due diligence’ aspect as pain free as possible, and the acceptance of a minimum standard via accreditation potentially offers the customer a one stop check of quality, for many being signatory to the ICOC has been the first of such checks. However, the private maritime security sector is still unregulated and whilst the majority of companies offer a very high quality transparent service, concerns remain that there will always be others who will choose not to comply with any standard and offer maritime security at less cost. For a financially beleaguered shipping sector, smaller operators might be tempted by these cheaper and un-regulated security providers in a valiant bid to cut the cost of maritime security on a transit.

As in all businesses, ultimately, it is for the customer to decide which providers to contract, a decision driven in the main by the quality of the product and the value for money. In the security sector, there is additional impetus for transparency in the delivery of such a high-risk product. Whether that standard of service is insisted upon by the client, adopted and demonstrated by the provider through accreditation or ignored entirely, only the shipping community can decide as to which standard it wants to uphold. Whether the cost of due diligence or accreditation is borne by the customer or the provider, both are striving for the same thing, a quality product offering a credible deterrent against piracy, ensuring the safe passage of seafarers across the oceans. Regulation of the maritime security sector is coming; many PMSC’s welcome this and as far as seafarers and their families are concerned, just behind the last line of defence against hijack and captivity, this can only be hugely reassuring.

Deployment of motherships by West African pirates is now an indisputable truth

Four staging vessels were used to aid attacks on ships and oil rigs in the first quarter off the coast of Nigeria, it says.

In a report from experts, explains the use of mother ships the region is “now proven beyond doubt”, six months after it first raised the alarm on the issue.

The change in tactics has been accompanied by an increase in the range of pirate activity in the area.

A 12 January attack on a bulk carrier 290 nautical miles from Lagos is the farthest reported offshore incident off Nigeria since it began work in the area in 2007.

Two skiffs and a fishing vessel were deployed in the assault.

It also seems as though the pirates have changed their area of activity once again, leading to an upturn in activity in the Niger Delta during the first quarter.

It notes 13 separate attacks occurred in the first three months of 2012 as gangs which had shifted operations to Benin and Lagos “returned home”.

Mohamed Abshir Waldo, a Kenya-based Somali journalist and analyst wrote in 2009: “The origin [of the piracy] … goes back to 1992, after the fall of the Siad Barre regime and the disintegration of the Somali navy and police coastguard services. Following severe droughts in 1974 and 1986, tens of thousands of nomads, whose livestock were wiped out by the droughts, were re-settled all along the villages on the long Somali coast.

They developed into large fishing communities, whose livelihood depended on inshore fishing. From the beginnings of the civil war in Somalia (as early as 1991-92) illegal fishing trawlers started to trespass and fish in Somali waters, including the 12-mile inshore artisanal fishing waters. The poaching vessels encroached on the local fishermen’s grounds, competing for the abundant rock-lobster and high-value pelagic fish in the warm, up-swelling 60kms deep shelf along the tip of the Horn of Africa …”Waldo goes on to say that the fishermen took up arms to defend themselves and became a kind of coastguard.

This analysis is backed by President Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, of Puntland, an autonomous region of northern Somalia, who told the London conference on Somali piracy last year what followed next. “The violation of Somali waters by foreign trawlers triggered a reaction of armed resistance by Somali fishermen, whose livelihoods were disrupted by the illegal fishing fleets,” he said. “Over time, payment of ransom by the foreign trawlers to the poor fishermen of Somalia encouraged the escalation of pirate attacks to current levels. Consequently, the illegal fishers linked themselves with local warlords for protection, placing armed militiamen on board the trawlers. The fishermen-turned-pirates then targeted unarmed commercial vessels, inhumanly taking hostages for ransom and disrupting international maritime trade routes.”

Others say it is not so simple, and that in east Africa the overuse of the resource did not lead directly to violence, even though it may have played a part. Last year, the British defence and security think tank the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (Rusi) devoted a journal to Somali piracy, calling it the “single biggest maritime threat since the Second World War, with consequences resonating far beyond Somali shores that have political, geostrategic, naval, economic and human security aspects”. In another Rusi paper, sadly not available on the web, Stig Jarle Hansen, a Wales-based “professor and researcher of piracy in Somalia”, argues that while illegal fishing has been an underlying cause and justification for piracy, any claims that Somali piracy started as a form of coastguard, protecting Somali fisheries, are dubious. “Piracy is motivated by the quest for profit. Nevertheless, illegal fishing narratives do contribute to the pirates’ local legitimacy, and need to be undermined in order to fight piracy,” he writes.

However, it is abundantly clear that there is a distinct similarity in the language used by the Somali fishermen some years ago and what the fishermen of Senegal say today. Jeylani Shaykh Abdi, a fisherman in Merca, 100km south of Mogadishu, quoted by IRIN in 2006: “They are not only taking and robbing us of our fish, but they are also trying to stop us from fishing. It is now normal to see them on a daily basis, a few miles off our shores. They destroy our nets and they take our fish. They regularly come inshore at night. If nothing is done about them, there soon won’t be much fish left in our coastal waters.”

A Joal fisherman last week complained that illegal fishermen are laundering their catches through mother ship factories, trans-shipment and resupply at sea: “The catches are already down 75% on 10 years ago because of the foreign fishing boats. They destroy our gear. If this goes on there will be a catastrophe. Until now we haven’t taken any direct action against the foreign fishermen. Once we took the captain from one of the vessels and we beat him around the balls. “For sure, in 10 years time people will go fishing with guns. They are desperate. When people had enough to eat and drink, Senegal was a calm country. As the situation becomes more difficult it will become more and more like Somalia. We will fight for fish at sea. If we cannot eat, what do you expect us to do?”

More than twenty officers and ratings of the corps filed out in their brown and grey uniforms in front of the corps office at 6, Force Road, Onikan, Lagos.

Agaba said Nigeria has been losing huge resources and revenue accruable from the sea to the activities of sea pirates and other criminals.

“In every country, the vital role being played by the Merchant Navy Security and Safety Corps cannot be underestimated, as the Merchant Navy is regarded as the fourth arm of the nation defense after the Army, Navy and the Air Force,” he said.

“It was in regard of our vital role that in 1999, the commander of the corps, Allen Benson Edema, with other officers and ratings, participated in the war at Sierra Leone. Also, as far back as 1922, officers and ratings of the corps participated in wars in Britain and America and have assisted the navy in combating crime both locally and internationally.”

On the issue of the legitimacy of the Merchant Navy Security and Safety Corps which has been in contention in court, he said the officers and men of the corps are relevant to the maritime industry in the country and should be recognised, supported and empowered to carry out their functions.

“We have appealed the case about whether we are legal or not, but the issue is far more political than legal. We cannot play politics with a vital agency like the Nigeria Merchant Navy, due to some grouse some people have with our existence,” Agaba said.

“We are not competing with any security agency in Nigeria. In the entire world, Merchant Navy is the soul of the maritime industry, as we have the expertise to detect and prevent any sea crime. Our focus is to stop the criminality on our waterways which cannot be left unchecked because of the colossal damage it can cause our country.”

Speaking on the new uniforms, he said the uniforms are meant to differentiate the corps from the Navy and other security agencies.

“Our new uniforms are meant to differentiate us from other security agencies and from other mushroom maritime unions who may impersonate us. We are using this medium to call on the members of the public to report any fake merchant navy officer to the police and, also, the police can arrest and prosecute any impersonator wearing our uniform. Meanwhile we are calling on the Senate to expedite action on the passage of the Nigeria Merchant Navy Security and Safety corps bill which is in its second reading,” Agaba said.

“Our new uniforms are in line with the uniforms of international organisations we belong to, like the International Transport Workers Federation (ITWF) and the International Marine Organisation (IMO), so that these uniforms will differentiate us from the Nigerian Navy and also to enable us to work as a team with other security agencies to fight crime on the sea.”

24 March 12, a merchant vessel was attacked by one skiff approximately 300nm southeast of the Omani coast, in position 16 58N 064 48E (Alert 024/12).

25 March 12, a merchant vessel was attacked by two skiffs approximately 140nm northeast of Socotra Island (Alert 025/12).

26 March 12, a merchant vessel was attacked by one skiff as a part of a whaler PAG approximately 300nm west of the north Seychelles, in position 05 21S 049 18E (Alert 026/12).

27 March 12, a merchant vessel was hijacked 200nm west of the northern Maldives in position 07 00N 069 49E (Alert 027/12).

28 March 12, a PAG has been confirmed active approximately 160nm off the coast of central Somalia, in vicinity of position 08 30 N 053 00 N (Alert 028/12). The PAG is reported as a suspicious blue coloured skiff with 7 persons on board and a hooked ladder.

Masters are advised to proceed through these areas with extreme caution, and be aware that the PAGs responsible for the recent attacks in the north Arabian Sea are still believed to be near the areas of the attacks.

Although this area has seen a lower level of activity compared to the past two weeks, Masters are still advised that piracy can occur at any time and that merchant vessels transiting this area maintain vigilance through the GOA and SRS areas.